April 26, 2003
From the desk of Mindles H. Dreck:Missed Congeniality
David Warren's most recent column asserts that the Bush administration is attempting to deprive our allies and enemies of the 'weapon' of anti-Americanism by simply raising the stakes:
earlier this week, when the secretary of state, Colin Powell, was asked unambiguously by media whether the U.S. intended to "punish" (their word) France for her recent behaviour over Iraq, and he replied in one word: "Yes."One had to refer to other officials to gather that this would be done most likely by cutting France out of the consultation process in NATO and among other U.S. allies, and by "disinviting" France to other trans-Atlantic fora, thus isolating the Chirac regime diplomatically even within Europe.
.....For decades foreign powers have been able to influence U.S. policy simply by fomenting anti-American displays. This is what Arab regimes do, to put pressure on the U.S. State Department -- it's called the "Arab Street" -- and what President Chirac did, in touching off a frenzy of anti-Americanism in the "European Street", as a way to pressure President Bush to stand down, and Prime Minister Blair to fall down. The Americans, and British, went into Iraq anyway; and the former at least seem now convinced that anti-Americanism should no longer be either subtly or overtly rewarded. It will instead be subtly ignored, or overtly punished.
Compare Warren's essay with this interview with John Brady Kiesling, former Athens-based diplomat who resigned publically in protest over the administration's conduct prior to the war in Iraq (His resignation letter is all over the internet. Here, for instance).
Kiesling's principled sincerity is attractive, but I think these two pieces highlight some problematic differences about what constitutes "successful" foreign policy.
For Kiesling, probably because of his diplomatic posting, the popularity of the U.S. is a paramount objective. He complains to Terry Gross that the U.S. had been viewed as a "necessary evil" in Europe during the cold war. According to Kiesling, acceptance of the U.S. as a potential partner in progress was growing slowly during the Clinton years and has since fallen off a cliff.
Secondly, Kiesling places a high value on treaty-making. It is clear in the interview that he believes the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty was a high water mark in international diplomacy, made possible by the kind of multilateral conciliation that the U.S. has foresworn.
Kiesling's description of anti-American sentiment strike me as mostly accurate. I don't believe we had gained much popularity in the Clinton years. My experience is that America-bashing was as much of a sport as it is now. I asked the radio what happens to "necessary evil" when it is perceived as no longer necessary. I have my own memories of Germany in the 1980s (the good old days of Sauren Reagan). Perhaps a pop culture reference is inappropriate in this sort of post, but whenever this subject comes up I think of this Joe Jackson song from about 1985:
Here in Berlin people line up to get in
To wait for the end, living in glorious sin
They've looked around and now there is no looking back
To when rivers ran red, now it's the sky that grows black
Shadows are cast as two giants roam over the earth
We light a match, but what is that little flame worth?Once allies danced and sang
But it was forty years agoHere in D.C. they talk about 'Euro-disease'
And how the French are always so damn hard to please
Motions are passed in Brussels but no-one agrees
And no-one walks tall, but no-one gets down on their kneesOnce allies laughed and drank
But it was forty years agoWhere I come from they don't like Americans much
Think they're so loud and so tasteless and so out of touch
Stiff upper lips are curled into permanent sneers
Self-satisfied awaiting the next forty yearsOnce allies cried and cheered
But it was forty years ago
The U.S. willingness to engage in brinksmanship and our jaded view that diplomacy often degrades into feckless jawboning have never been popular. This is far from new.
I have more critical differences with Kiesling's characterization of the NNPT. Negotiating such a treaty is not an end in itself. It may be a great success of diplomacy but it has not necessarily been a great success for non-proliferation, it's stated goal. I am tempted to observe that it largely binds the behavior of nations whom we would trust to have WMDs and fails to bind those we are most concerned about. Whether North Korea has nukes or not, prior treaty-making clearly means nothing to them now. Where is the "achievement" in that, other than delivering an entirely false sense of security?
In sum, while I understand the utility to local diplomats, I cannot view the achievement of local popularity and treaties as ends in themselves, but rather consider them means . There are many means to a foreign policy/security end, and many more effective than pleasing talks with other powers. The peculiar Western-style martyrdom of repeated diplomatic failures holds scant appeal. We would certainly like certain governments to fear us (Syria and Iran, for instance). Fear rarely serves popularity.
These views need to be balanced. I believe it is entirely appropriate for the administration to work with the "quartet" for a solution for Palestine, especially since some of Bush's initial conditions have been met (not without a parting blow from Arafat and a disturbing loss of face for Abu Mazen, I notice). I also think the administration should be extending an olive branch to the more ambivalent countries that did not join the coalition. Isolation of France, I'm afraid, is entirely appropriate. De Villepin sandbagged Powell and should pay the price.
Perhaps the most interesting part of the interview is Kiesling's comment on Bosnia. Kiesling was an early advocate of military intervention in that case. When Gross asks about the difference between Iraq and Bosnia he claims that the "slaughter was ongoing", essentially implying that the pace of the killing and the lack of damage to our relationship with western powers make the critical difference.
Perhaps I am oversimplifying Kiesling's argument, but I'm having a hard time with that distinction. How are we to define the ratio of atrocities per diem-to-alliance damage that justifies intervention? Is the damage to our diplomatic potential so great as to nullify the end to Hussein's atrocities? I don't deny that we must make such a utilitarian calculation or cost/benefit analysis, but I don't see Saddam Hussein as so much more tolerable than Slobo (whatever history's final reckoning of his death count may be). I cannot escape the feeling that in Kiesling's analysis the entire difference between the two can be attributed to the cost to established alliances.
The lives of State Department professionals, like middle managers during cutbacks, are doubtless less pleasant when they must sell America's reprioritized self-interest. However, this is not a popularity contest and harried diplomats are far from a prohibitive cost where national security and the threat of pan-Arab fantasist/islamic fundamentalists are concerned.
I struggle not to discuss two other topics within this:
(think Maastricht).
The debate in the US about foreign policy is between those who value safety and those who value popularity. It is ultimately about character and those who believe in honor, honesty and the strength to do what is right despite the cost versus those who are comfortable with lying and dishonesty because their primary goal is to be popular.
Bill Clinton was more palatable to Europe because he is more comfortable with lying and dishonesty. He valued being liked more than he valued being safe.
Bush sees his job as insuring security and popularity be damned.
Liars and frauds like the Europeans tend to get agitated when their despicable lack of character is revealed for all to see. I think we can take pride that the fools and scoundrels of the world do not like us for our insistence on facing up to the difficult challenges we face. I just can't understand why some people prefer to mimic the ostrich when faced with evil.
"Isolation of France, I'm afraid, is entirely appropriate." Well, I'm afraid, isolation of France is not going to happen. And, I'm afraid, it's not just up to the U.S. whether to isolate France. Germany will have something to say about it, and Germany will side with France. So now the U.S. has to isolate France-Germany. And, when the governments of Italy and Spain change, as eventually they will, then the U.S. will need to isolate France-Germany-Spain-Italy. Not to mention the possibility of Russia. So the U.S. will not end up "isolating" France. At best it will end up isolating a much bigger bloc.
What I think interesting in this, is there are two paradigms for world relationship which are combatting: empire vs. balance-of-power. There are those in the U.S. who believe that America can behave like a sort of empire. There are those in Europe who think that a new balance-of-power can be formed. Who's right? Well, I hope both are wrong.
“Bill Clinton was more palatable to Europe because he is more comfortable with lying and dishonesty.”
That’s right, the Old Europeans felt more comfortable with somebody just as sleazy as they are. Bill Clinton endangered our nation during his presidency. The way he handled the first attack on the World Trade Center was utterly disgraceful.
“At best it (the United States) will end up isolating a much bigger bloc.”
So what? We can live with that outcome. It’s far better to be respected than liked. Our relationship with the scum bag Old Europeans should be premised upon cold politeness. These folks are contemptible and morally bankrupt. We should not forget, for instance, that Russian companies were supplying Saddam Hussein’s forces with military assistance while the latter where actually fighting our troops!
Whether or not we are succesful, an attempt to isolate France is justified.
Isn't the balance of power vs. empire dichotomy you mention more of a continuum? I don't see anyone, including the Bush administration, reserving all actions as unilateral.
At the end of the day, coalition-making is a means to power, not a lifestyle.
“Whether or not we are successful, an attempt to isolate France is justified. “
We will most likely be successful. Heck, we merely need to be mildly successful to truly hurt the French. France is today a mere shadow of its former greatness. This nation is a second rate entity pretending to be a world power. They deserve to find out how they really rate. A bit of humiliation will do the French a lot of good.
Will Germany offer the French some sort of protection from America? Let’s get serious, the Germans have enough troubles of their own.
I think that at least part of the problem with treaties (like NNPT, and for that matter the various Geneval Conventions) is that from the moment that a fixed and agreed-upon text is signed, the various parties' understanding of what the treaty actually says start to diverge rapidly and inexorably. The "popularity" course of diplomacy says that, if you want other nations to sign your treaties in the future, you should give them some reason to believe that you will share their interpretations. The "literalist" course says that you should hold people to your interpretation lest you seem weak. Each approach is necessary: You need other nations to think you both a good-faith bargainer and a self-righteous badass.
The NNPT, for instance, says a lot less than most journalists, politicians, and commentators read into it. Listen to commentators claim that it in some way enshrines or legitimizes the small "nuclear club", or that it somehow declares that non-nuclear nations have no right to seek to remedy their nuclear deficiency. Really it does little more than ask that nations give a bit of notice before they go nuclear so that established nations have the leverage of threatening to bomb them into slag during the waiting-period.
Since smaller countries' diplomacy has to be focused on the concensus-building side, exaggeration, hyperbole, and outright lies are par for the course in diplomacy; the post-cold-war superpower's predictable but somewhat alarming insistance that this is not the case is naturally alarming to nearly every other longstanding participant in international relations. To most of the world, grand gestures, weasely compromises, carefully metered notes, and symbolic declarations are the norm; to the current US, they seem somehow dastardly or disgusting. This is because the US doesn't have to concensus-build like everyone else.
On the other hand, in spite of all of the diplomatic disingenuity, the rest of the world has had plenty of time to resolve itself to the relative ham-handedness of US diplomacy. The French claims of innocence or ignorance in the pre-war UN smashup ring just as false as the administration's claims that it was backstabbed. Both sides know better, and knew better at the time.
--G
institutions survive because they generate mutually beneficial relationships. these relationships are not constant but migrate over time.
america's relationship with the UK and France changed in 1956 (suez crisis). france was and is still miffed, whereas, the uk pursued a different course.
america should reward those who support us and ignore (as oppose to punish) those who oppose us. our pursuit to reward and ignore should be quite exercises.
I am totally convinced the diplomats have little connection with their countries or their citizens.
The diplomats of the world act like they are in a big high school. What makes you feel important is what clique you are in. And your most important goal is to become popular. Your whole time is spent of gossiping with other diplomats about who is in what clique and who is trying to move to other cliques.
Along comes the Bush administration that doesn’t want to play high school and instead wants to accomplish some good in the world.
Diplomats realized how silly and purposeless their lives are and they become very angry. This anger is communicated to their pals in the press who are very eager to publish this friction.
The Bush administration is the best thing that every happened to world diplomacy. Diplomats might represent their citizens again instead of their personal interests.
-- The U.S. is typically unwilling to sign on to a treaty that it will not honor, whereas other powers are more comfortable with greater discrepancy between tatemae and honne.--
It's not a case of not honoring on the US side, it's law. The treaty becomes law, pure and simple and must be followed. If *the world* followed the US example on treaties and made them law, then I don't have a problem. But until they do, we should be party to the fewest possible. Most of the treaties designed by *the world* are made to tie the original renegade country down. IMHO. *The world* still has its collective knickers in a twist over Kyoto and ICC. Where possible, I link to the specific portions of the US Constitution as to how and why they weren't ratified.
The question is not whether we are respected or liked. Public opinion is ephemeral, unreliable, and to the extent it reflects things real, it reflects things that are likely behind us. That is, by the time opinion groups, interests, politicians, figure out their interests and organize "public opinion", realities have changed. For instance, there was a case to be made for not going down the road of regime change in Iraq, but that time was prior to stationing troops, whipping up opinion, passing additional resolutions etc. Once committed to this course, to back down by pretending to believe in inspections would have been a disaster and would have made the war on terrorism much more difficult. Had the democrats organized an anti war movement immediately they might have changed the outcome, but since they were fearful of public opinion, they were unwilling to lead and their resulting weakness destroyed any chance they might have had to avert the war.
On the other hand to the extent we attempt to measure public opinion by polls we are likely measuring superficial reactions to posed questions. Prewar opinion of this sort was irrelevant to the post war reality. Opinions have changed among those whose opinions tipped the balance of the polls, those whose opinions were open to change. Public opinion is something statesmen must attempt to shape, and by taking decisive effective action we have shaped post war opinion and with skillful diplomacy, effective governance, and the political courage to ignore the next wave of public opinion, Bush will enhance both our hard and soft our power. And it is not a choice between empire and balance of power. It is always balance of power, power enhanced by skillful nurturing of alliances. The UN is not an Alliance, NATO is. French policy of weakening NATO, and ehancing the UN and the security role of the EU has been weakened. So far so good.
Timmy,
I think you got it partly right.
Yes, institutions are created b/c the founding members see such an institution as providing some kind of benefit. (And the benefits may or may not be from the institution. In some cases, simply being a member of the institution, or present at the creation, is the point of the exercise, rather than whether the institution itself does anything per se.)
However, once an institution is created, then there will inevitably also develop an interest group intent on supporting it, maintaining it. The institution itself will seek to survive, even if its original purpose is eclipsed. Look at MADD (expanding purview), March of Dimes (evolving purpose) as smaller, NGO-type parallels for this kind of behavior.
Thus, institutions don't go away, even if the interests it originally served end, evaporate, etc. It would be nice, I suppose if they did (tidier, if nothing else).
For those interested in international law and institutions, this is a good thing. The idea is to create a web of these things, in order to make everyone behave more "civilized" and less "anarchically". However, as Sandy P. notes above, that only works if everyone buys in.
Which is not to say that the US is somehow necessarily a more law-abiding country (esp. to that amorphous thing called "international law"), only that we place the position of the written law in a higher relative place. Thus, we have actually passed laws against the use of corruption and bribery in FOREIGN trade, which can (and has) been applied to US multi-nat'l corporations---and saying "but others do it, too" doesn't cut it as a defense. This actually makes us rather unique.
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