Asymmetrical Information

Jane,

Very good post. It reminded me of a conversation I had with a professor of mine. He was trying to persuade me to pursue a career in science by pointing all the problems that would face society, such as climate change. He said we needed good scientists to tell us what we should do. I replied that science could only tell us the possibilities. We needed philosophers to tell us which of those possibilities to prefer. After a pause, he smiled, and said "Only if you have honest scientists." We need more honest scientists -- and bloggers, too.

Actually, I find a variant on the points brought up by Jane to be the biggest pain: if one supports a particular policy, there can be no downside to the policy. There are no tradeoffs whatsoever. And the converse. If one can find one downside to a particular policy, then the entire policy is, of course, completely invalid.

This is incredibly common, and thus instead of weighing the benefits and disadvantages of a particular policy, the defenders spend all their effort looking like idiots trying to pretend that there are no losers because of the policy, and the attackers look like idiots by finding the one loser, and proclaiming "thus the policy is a total failure".

It's pretty common in politics as well.

What I find interesting is how much of our political and policy debates are simply based on emotions. As the WSJ noted recently:

In a study presented this year, scientists scanned the brains of staunch Democrats and Republicans. The volunteers first read a statement from George W. Bush or John Kerry, then a news account showing their candidate's deeds didn't live up to his words -- for example, cutting funding for children's hospitals after extolling their importance -- suggesting pandering or lying. The volunteers then considered the contradictions.

You'd think this would tap reasoning ability. But no. According to the brain scans, the reasoning regions of the brain stayed quiet; emotion circuits lit up like Vegas. The volunteers denied obvious contradictions from their candidate, but detected them easily in the other guy. Partisan beliefs are so hardened and so tied to emotion, they're extremely hard to change, concluded Drew Westen of Emory University, who led the study.

Good post Jane. I think the source of the problem is this: in the physical sciences (most of them) you can take a thousand cases that are identical except for one variable, and see what laws are true. That'll quash the debate pretty nicely. Social sciences can't hope to have anywhere near that kind of experimental precision. (A lot of long-term medical studies too, and many of them don't even try to control for alternate causes that a lay reader suggests on hearing about the study.) So, people are always going to have a little room to discount what they don't believe in.

Tom West made a good point too, but I have an example he won't like:

Actually, I find a variant on the points brought up by Jane to be the biggest pain: if one supports a particular policy, there can be no downside to the policy. There are no tradeoffs whatsoever.

I saw the same thing recently when I tried to discuss Social Security. I mentioned how it's an example of a legal Ponzi scheme. Then some poster just went nuts to say that somehow, funding a pension by forcing new suckers into it, is *not* a Ponzi scheme.

Now, there are people who believe SS is a Ponzi scheme. There are people who believe SS is a good idea. But, what you need to keep in mind is, there are people who believe SS is a good idea and a Ponzi scheme! Prominent economists, in fact. So obviously, you can believe it's a Ponzi scheme and still support it. But some people just refuse to admit that, and I think that seriously undermines their credibility. Just accept the bads, and move on.

Jane,
You should read "On Certainty" by Ludwig Wittgenstein. You are getting into some deep water about how people "know" things and when they are willing to discard one belief for another. Do you revise your political beliefs based on what you read & study? Or do you test what you read and study AGAINST your political views? For most people, there's a bit of both going on all the time. You have to hold some beliefs as certain, beyond a doubt, in order to process the truth value of a new piece of information. But it's tricky, and far from logical, even for the best of us.

Tom West makes a great point, one that I've often thought as well. You find this on both sides of practically any issue. Take ANWR: Proponents of drilling aren't content to say that drilling will produce more benefits than costs. They also act as if there are no costs in the first place -- the place where we would drill is just a swamp anyway, and the natives want drilling, and the caribou like oil pipelines, etc. (All of which might be true, I don't know.) And opponents aren't content to say that the costs outweigh the benefits. Instead, they act as if there are no benefits at all -- ANWR barely has any oil anyway, and there is no reason to drill other than lining the pockets of crooked oilmen.

Nobody wants to admit that there might be actual tradeoffs.

Jane Galt, economics may not be able to tell us whether the costs outweigh the benefits since this may depend on our individual value systems, however economics should try to tell us what the actual effects of any given policy will be. Slanting the predictions of effects to favor the policy you prefer should subject you to criticism when detected.

I mentioned how it's an example of a legal Ponzi scheme.

No, that's a rhetorical device. While there are similarities between a Ponzi scheme and SS, it's no more a Ponzi scheme than "taxation is theft". There are people who will argue that, but when you're using words that are *meant* to define bad activities to define an activity, you are simply using rhetoric to make the case rather than facts.

It's like calling everyone criminals because we've all benefitted from the proceeds of a crime (slavery, murder, etc.) It might be techically true, but it's useless as an conveyor of fact.

Stuart: What? Alaskans *do* mostly favor drilling, and the place *does* look like a frozen parking lot. Not sure that's an example of someone denying all negatives. "All of which might be true", indeed.

Tom: I think you're partially agreeing with me. My argument wasn't "SS should be repealed specifically because it's a Ponzi scheme". I wasn't even talking about Social Security at the time, but the legal status of Ponzi schemes. Such statements are technically true, like you say, and that's exactly why the appropriate response is:

"Yes, it's a Ponzi scheme, but it's a good Ponzi scheme because ... "

"Yes, taxation is theft, but necessary to ..."

"Yes, everyone is criminal, but there are degrees of crime ..."

The problem is that people adamantly refuse to admit any *anything* negative about their pet policies.

However, unlike you, I find that such statements are useful: they force the participants to narrow down precisely what principles they're drawing from.

-that they're not in principle against Ponzi funding

-that not all theft is unjustified

-that being a criminal is not a blanket disqualification for everything

Person,

Are you saying that:

a) even people who believe that SS is Ponzi scheme will support it as necessary

b) or that YOU think it's a Ponzi scheme?

Person, I see your point, but using partially accurate inflammatory terms seems to to make sustaining a real debate harder rather than easier. It means that you have to spend unnecessary effort to override the emotional baggage associated with the term, and it also means that you have to divorce parts of the definition from the parts that you debating.

Take the Ponzi scheme description for SS. You are, of course, referring to the "pay as you go" aspect of the Ponzi scheme, but presumably (if you're actually engaged in real debate) you are *not* assuming the other elements of the Ponzi scheme such as a deliberate attempt to defraud the public, the illegality, etc.

It's not terribly accurate, and it makes it harder to engage in useful factual exchange.

More likely, by using the Ponzi scheme terminology, you're attempting to make the link of one negative aspect with a hold raft of other negative aspects. It's a pretty common rhetorical trick, and one that is fairly effective if you can persuade your opponent to follow along (which it is why it is used). However, it is not very effective in helping factual debate.

Also, in politics it lays you open to the charge that you admit to equating all aspects of the policy with the negative term. You may not get the chance to refte that charge when quoted without the entire context.

So, I see your point, but I think the costs thoroughly outweight the benefits :-).

This is basically a very good post, but it has one statement that, if not misguided, is at least likely to confuse the witless: "Value judgements are hard to argue with--is green a better colour than blue? Should we have justice or peace?"

Just because value judgments are hard to argue with, doesn't mean they are impossible to argue with. People who work on ethical and political theory, both inside and outside academia, think very hard about these questions and, even when they disagree, they have a great deal to say on the question. In fact, I would say that if one spent 40 hours reading reading contemporary ethical philosophy, an average person would change more of his value judgments than he would change *fact* judgments after reading 40 hours of, say, social science research.

That last sentence was too convoluted. But the point is that you *seem* to be setting up a quasi-Weberian distinction between facts, which we can have rational discussions about, and values, which are completely immune to reason. Rational discussion, debate and persuasion is just as possible for values as for facts. (I would even take the phenomenon that inspired this blog post -- people rarely changing their factual judgments in response to new evidence -- as confirming my point.)

As a follow up to what I just said -- it is also important to note that their is a distinction between *value judgments* and matters of taste. If I like corn bisque and you like clam chowder, arguments about which is better are trivial (although not useless!); it could simply be that one of us likes corn bisque, and the other likes clam chowder. But value judgments are not matters of taste.

-- "Yes, it's a Ponzi scheme, but it's a good Ponzi scheme because..."
-- "Yes, taxation is theft, but necessary to..."
-- "Yes, everyone is criminal, but there are degrees of crime..."

This is too clever by a half. The approach suggested here basically takes the arguer's preferred definitions, and then insists that these must be the first principles for the debate. No room is left for the respondant to point out that the definitions in question are not even the commonly agreed-upon ones, let alone principles that both parties can work from.

That's a pretty neat trick if you're the arguer, but it is useless as a broadly-constructive suggestion for good debate technique.

Take the second of those, for example. In any dictionary, "tax" and "theft" do not have the same definition -- or even a nearly-same definition with minor distinguishing qualifiers -- because lexicographical surveys have regularly found that a majority of persons on average do not ascribe identical or near-identical meannings to those words. This is hardly exciting news, because virtually no society in recorded history has existed without expecting its members to make some sort of communal contribution in exchange for receiving access to communal benefits.

Therefore, someone who begins an argument about taxation being theft as a general principle, is not making a claim that the other party is in any way required to support.

The other two proposed examples disintegrate in similar fashion.

This is too clever by a half. The approach suggested here basically takes the arguer's preferred definitions, and then insists that these must be the first principles for the debate. No room is left for the respondant to point out that the definitions in question are not even the commonly agreed-upon ones, let alone principles that both parties can work from.

Mouse ... er ... what? If the respondent does not not agree with those first principles, he should, I don't know, say so, and then say why. If those are not the definitions he is using, he should specifcy exactly what definition he is using, and how he distinguishes it from the labled thing. In either case, both participants get a better understanding of exactly where they disagree, and therefore of the other's position. No one's ground is being taken away, as you seem to think.

As for the definition of tax/theft, I'd have to disagree in that both refer to a kind of involuntary transfer, and I'd warn you that you're gettting close the error Jane is describing in her blog post, and I described above: a tax you like is still a tax. Separately, theft you like, is still theft.

Therefore, someone who begins an argument about taxation being theft as a general principle, is not making a claim that the other party is in any way required to support.

Good point. Your first paragraph *was* in error.

Tom_West:

using partially accurate inflammatory terms seems to to make sustaining a real debate harder rather than easier. It means that you have to spend unnecessary effort to override the emotional baggage associated with the term

I'd again disagree. There's probably a reason for that baggage, and distinguishing one's position from that negative baggage is necessary for clarifying the debate.

Take the Ponzi scheme description for SS. You are, of course, referring to the "pay as you go" aspect of the Ponzi scheme, but presumably (if you're actually engaged in real debate) you are *not* assuming the other elements of the Ponzi scheme such as a deliberate attempt to defraud the public, the illegality, etc.

Am I? What if I showed you statements from the early SS years that claimed the government was literally holding money for you until you retire, rather than fleecing another sucker? What if I could convince you that a government pension system did not actually consititute interstate commerce?

Also, in politics it lays you open to the charge that you admit to equating all aspects of the policy with the negative term. You may not get the chance to refte that charge when quoted without the entire context.

That's true, but blogs, essays, and journals, especially on the internet do not have these time and space constraints. (If you noticed the redundancy of "blogs on the internet" and decide to point it out, I will find where you live and beat you with a fruit basket.)

Not every purchase of a lottery ticket is taxation of an innumerate. Now that I no longer live in a state where the proceeds go directly to the government school monopoly I buy one every once in a while fully aware of the probabilities. If I were playing with any amount of money larger than a buck or two every couple of months the odds would be that I could play much longer for my money with video poker, but there is a mood I get into where I can recieve a dollar's worth of adrenaline rush and fantasy from that purchase.

Actually, a better title would be "try harder", as in "try harder to think rather than emote". I've seen people with fuzzy socialist leanings become a lot less so under the pressure of thinking. Sometimes it was as simple as reading the stub of their paycheck & contemplating all the deductions, other times it was more abstract.

Training in the scientific method helps, in my personal experience, although often not with 'social scientists' for some reason or other...

Good point. Your first paragraph *was* in error.

Having re-read your posts and my response, I *think* I see where you're coming from...but I don't think mine was a freak mis-reading. IMO there are better ways of addressing that kind of situation that don't require conceding the entire ground of the arguer's position (which, in that sort of case, they will often take as a sign of weakness in whatever the respondant is about to present).

I prefer the slightly subtler approach:

"Okay, for the sake of the argument, let's assume your position that 'x' is, in fact, 'y'. I still say that point can be further qualified by..."

The result of this will be one of two things: either the arguer will release his/her death grip on the contested 'x is y' point and continue with the debate; or, s/he will adamantly return to the Absolute Truth of 'x is y', and then the respondant knows immediately that the only remaining options are to simply abandon the arguer, or suit up in combat gear.

Does this put us on roughly the same page?

anony-mouse: Yes, I think that puts us on the same page.

About that lottery ticket jibe:

Lotteries and insurance exploit the same principle of the human psyche: we overvalue the extremely unlikely and extremely large event. We pay more for a lottery ticket than its expected value. We pay more for an insurance policy than the expected value of the loss.

So does buying insurance reveal my innumeracy?

Ken

Actually in Australia the word "tax" is often used to mean "steal".

As in "Some bastard taxed my bike this morning." or "I taxed these glasses from the local pub."

"You know what? I don't give a [hoot] whether gay marriage does damage society. If our society can't be just without going under, then we don't deserve to survive." That's a good answer.

This is not a good answer. It's an adolescent answer. "If it can't be according to my ideal, then I don't care if the whole thing goes down in flames." That's not good or wise or sensible. It's childish. It's also a common left-liberal sentiment, at least where matters of race, immigration, or homosexuality are involved. These folks would get a certain satisfaction at seeing Western civilization collapse if it doesn't live up to their ideals. Leave aside that human nature and human societies don't work according to liberal principles. Leave aside that the alternatives to Western society are all worse than what we have now according to these yardsticks liberals care about. Nope, they are just so darned starry-eyed and idealistic that they'd rather see us go under than have their latest precious liberal ideal of the day violated. The gay one amuses me especially because even ten years ago no one was thinking the least bit about homosexual marriage. Now all of a sudden it's apparently become a do-or-die measure of the worth of our civilization. Give me a break.

I have always felt that a statistical results are best used to find if something is important, not if it is true. There are many true statments in economics that fail to be important when considered in a general equlibrium, let alone the real world. There are also many thing that are important for the economy that are not part of economic theory.

Mark

While I agree that it would be a mistake to collapse civilisation for the sake of gay marriage, you are on dangerous ground with your statement that it is always wrong to hold your ideals in greater regard than the stability of society. This is going down the Benthemite fallacy (society should be operated for the greatest good of the greatest number), if a few suffer for the many, that's fine in other words. A veriant of this philosophy has driven many totalitarian regimes.

I can think of ideals or moral positions that it is worth collapsing the current order in order to implement, for instance the moral position that genocide is wrong justified the destruction of a society (pre-war Germany). If you looked at 1945 Germany you might say that we had failed in a Benthamite sense (the jews were no better off, plus everyone else were now living in ruins). So, to come back to your example, while I do not agree with the position, I see how a reasonable person could hold the view that gay marriage is good even if civilisation collapses if it is implemented. I think this is Jane's point - it is helpful when people clarify their moral positions this way. You can then decide whether you are having an argument with their moral position (gay marriage is a human right - no it's not) or the practical consquences of their moral position (the world will be in ruins if we implement gay marriage - no it won't be).

I find it highly unlikely that gay parents make much of a difference one way or another

That is exactly what the left said about non-biological parents when they decided that single motherhood is just another type of family. After forty years of research, and villifying a lot of good men like Daniel Patrick Moynihan, research shows that, guess what, biological parents really do matter. See also: the research of Sara McLanahan and Gary Sandefur.

But that's probably only true if you are talking about straight non-biological parents, right? Gay non-biological parents should be just fine?

In any case, the research now (both for and against) is way too early. It will take a couple decades of quality longitudinal studies that do not suffer from selection effects.

I remember a management seminar I attended once where they showed us a movie with John Cleese of Monty Python fame - who was doing consulting work, believe it or not. But he had a suggestion which has stuck with me. It was to replace "I think" with "I propose". It makes all the difference. We become invested in what we "think", but we recognize the possibility of error or disagreement in what we "propose".

Now, when commenting on blogs I seldom use "I propose", because I just don't want to appear to be hedging while making a kick-ass point. But I do keep it in mind. And when there's something truly at stake, like a group decision at work for example, I do use it.

Nice post, Jane. We often forget how often theory informs the tests we perform and what evidence we accept and don't accept. If you know that demand curves slope downward, you'll search like the dickens to find a demand shift, an income shift, or something like that if prices rise and quantity increases. If you know that anthropogenic CO2 increases mean global temperature, you'll make the adjustments you need for "background noise and trends" to find that needle in the haystack. If on the other hand you just try to "let the data speak" (which for any moderately complicated question is essentially impossible) you stop any time you like and report what you found. There is precious little empirics not motivated by theory, and precious few measurements that can be taken with sufficient precision to "prove" anything. That doesn't make econometric (or adoption studies or numeric climatology) feckless -- it just means you have to read results very carefully to know what they mean and depend on the honesty of the researcher to question his own priors in a reasonable way.

`

...it all boils down to "epistemology"

How do human beings 'know' anything with certainty ??

`

Kenneth makes a good point. There's no reason that utility functions should be linear, or discounting be non-hyperbolic, for the person with such things to be considered rational.

There's very good reason why one would be willing to pay a premium far in excess of expected losses, especially when the loss distribution has a really long tail (also, why insurance companies try to get that tail-loss capped in a variety of ways, such as using reinsurance and getting tort limits passed in law.) I find insurance to be a fascinating subject (I ought to, I'm an actuary), and there are lots of issues that go into setting rates and developing products.

As a total aside. There are circumstances in which playing the lottery is a positive expected value game, and thus an economically sound decision. The main key is the pot size. When a jackpot is not hit (at least in the US), the dollars in that jackpot rollover into the next jackpot. Thus, while the first lottery was a poor value, the second is better. If this process is repeated enough times, then the lottery becomes positive expected value.

In addition, certain numbers (birthdays, primes, perfect squares) are selected more frequently than others. If you were to play these unpopular numbers, you are much less likely to share the jackpot if it hits.

Thus a strategy of only playing when the jackpot becomes large with unpopular numbers can be seen as a good proposition.

Of course you will still almost certainly lose your money, but the wager may have positive expected value.

I seriously doubt that economics absolutely determines that you should not buy a lottery ticket. Under most economic theories I'm familiar with, individuals try to maximize utility, not cash flow.

For the vast majority of people, winning the lottery is the only way to achieve what I like to call "transformational money" -- i.e. so much money that the entire way you live your life can be changed. The chance of experiencing this transformation provides utility for many people who play the lottery. Additionally, many people get utility simply from the act of gambling itself -- e.g. that's why I play craps in Vegas even though I know the house has the edge. In fact, I usually know to the second decimal point what the house's edge is on each bet I place -- but I bet anyway because gambling's fun.

So Jane, I think what you meant to say was that mathematics can prove that you shouldn't buy a lottery ticket. Economics can prove no such thing.

I happen to think that extremely heavy progressive taxation has economic costs to those on the bottom of the income distribution that far outweigh its benefits.

Okay, so I'm going off on a bit of a tangent: Bad as the economic costs of heavily progressive taxation are, they pale before the sociopolitical cost of having a large number of voters who perceive that they can vote for all the goodies they want, and someone else will pay for them.

I can think of ideals or moral positions that it is worth collapsing the current order in order to implement

I'll propose ending slavery in the South as another example of this. Furthermore, I suspect that if a fixed timetable for ending slavery had been established in 1787 (when a good many southerners agreed that slavery was bad in principal even though they couldn't afford to end it right away), the disruption and suffering from ending it thus would have been much, much less than what continuing slavery eventually led to.

This is going down the Benthemite fallacy (society should be operated for the greatest good of the greatest number), if a few suffer for the many, that's fine in other words. A veriant of this philosophy has driven many totalitarian regimes.

Utilitarianism is a fallacy?

"I think one of the biggest problems facing ... social scientists, is the feeling that if you're just a little bit willing to fudge facts, you could do a great deal of good". Celebrate; rejoice; advances have been made. When I knew a bit about social science, some thirty years ago, it went far beyond 'a little bit willing'.

This is, actually, a problem that was largely the creation of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education. The Court could and should have said that segregation by race is wrong and unconstitutional without scientific study of the matter, but it felt compelled to cite sociological studies on race and education - and in so doing, convinced generations of activists that public policies based upon the value judgments, experiences and democratic antennae of legislators could be defeated in the courts by the application of social science. In the Brown case, of course, the Court used that method to reach the right result - but the consequences of the method have been with us ever since.

Jane's original point about how people argue made me think of the Drug War (or, as I prefer to call it, the War on Some Drugs*). When I suggest to someone that legalization or decriminalization of marijuana, or of other illegal drugs, would lead to a net improvement in society, the usual objection is that "more people would use it then!" This is presented as a refutation of my point, rather than as a negative that I must take into account. If I respond, "Yes, but...", my interlocutor generally believes I have agreed with their refutation. Few people seem to understand that there might be greater evils than more smoking of joints.

* My ex-wife once went into a drug-store to fill a prescription. The pharmacist was wearing a "Just Say No to Drugs!" button. She said, "You'd be out of a job." When he returned with her prescription he'd taken off the button.

"I think one of the biggest problems facing ... social scientists, is the feeling that if you're just a little bit willing to fudge facts, you could do a great deal of good".

This is what happens when intellectuals become partisans. An effective intellectual should be objective in seeking the truth while an effective partisan seeks to promote a particular point of view. When the two mix it is inevitably the intellectual side that suffers. Promotion of a preconceived point of view trumps objectivity more often than we would care to admit.

A partisan can't think while a thinker can't be a partisan.

Justin, perhaps the study actually showed that having two parents are better than having one parent, rather than the two parents needing to be biological parents. It would be interesting to compare children of biological parents versus adopted children to see whether the biology makes that big of a difference.

Otherwise, it's tough to make that leap...

This little side-thread died down a while ago, but it seems to me that Social Security is actually WORSE than a ponzi scheme.
I disagree with Tom's three characteristics of illegality, defrauding of the public and pay-as-you-go.
Something is illegal just because we say it is - that doesn't mean you can't compare it to something else that happens to be legal. After all, there are a lot of similarities in shooting quail vs. shooting bald eagles.

Secondly, it's soft-pedaling to describe Social Security or Ponzi schemes as pay-as-you-go. What distinguishes them is that generation actually gets more back than subsequent generations. As a result the scheme collapses. When people talk about SS vs ponzi schemes, THIS is the aspect they are referring to.

So why is SS worse than ponzi? Because it is coerced. I don't like the fact that fools get sucked into ponzi schemes, but at least they have themselves to blame.
But social security cannot be avoided - a big fat tax is taken out of every paycheck. Current recipients chant that they are merely being repaid what they put in. And when I become eligible, no doubt I'll do the same. THat's what makes it insidious. Social security gives ponzi schemes a bad name.

“Value judgements are hard to argue with--is green a better colour than blue? Should we have justice or peace? Thus, we all seek to make our value preferences into facts, rather than opinions.”

What your are doing here is exactly was Pope Benedict was addressing in his controversial address at University of Regensburg. He said,

The subject then decides, on the basis of his experiences, what he considers tenable in matters of religion, and the subjective "conscience" becomes the sole arbiter of what is ethical. In this way, though, ethics and religion lose their power to create a community and become a completely personal matter. This is a dangerous state of affairs for humanity, as we see from the disturbing pathologies of religion and reason which necessarily erupt when reason is so reduced that questions of religion and ethics no longer concern it. Attempts to construct an ethic from the rules of evolution or from psychology and sociology, end up being simply inadequate. (end of quote)

Not all values are subjective preferences. Some values are universally held and to deny them is to deny the best of what it is to be human. Take the value of courage, can you imagine a society were cowardice was held with more value than courage? The answer is not to try less, but like pope Benedict explained we need to broaden the use of reason to bring the important questions that religion and ethics ask out of the subjective realm.

Cure of Ars,

Re; "...we need to broaden the use of reason to bring the important questions that religion and ethics ask out of the subjective realm."

But values are in the subjective realm. Any specific human brain is in only one person, therefore values are in only one person. Many are the philosophers and religious devotees who would have their own values mandated as objective. Personally, I think the attempt to do so is immoral.

Randy,

“But values are in the subjective realm. Any specific human brain is in only one person, therefore values are in only one person. Many are the philosophers and religious devotees who would have their own values mandated as objective. Personally, I think the attempt to do so is immoral.”

Am I being objectively immoral or only immoral in the sense of your own subjective value standards? If subjective, I hope you are not trying to mandate your subjective values onto me.

I agree that values have a subjective element but some values are also based in natural law which is written into us as who we are as humans. Your argument has as it’s premise that humans are so different that there is no commonality to base any objective value standards. If you are right then on what basis can you tell anyone that they are wrong? On what grounds would you tell the early American slave owners that they were wrong for not valuing African American’s as equals? Most you could really says was that subjectively you value Africans American’s as equal but the slave owners would not be objectively wrong for valuing them less. They would be right based on their own subjective values.

There is also the problem that in a society that only has subjective values to base standard on, the only thing that makes something socially right or wrong is power. Might makes right which is scary.

"some values are also based in natural law which is written into us as who we are as humans"

Really? Where is this law written? In our DNA? In a cave in the mountains? If only it were so easy to get the answer to moral problems. This reminds me of the argument that used to be voiced for established religion along the lines that without a higher authority to tell us what to do we will simply sink into barbarity. It wasn't a very good argument for religion (we should believe because it's makes for good order).

Unfortunately (or maybe not) we really do have to make our own moral decisions, this isn't a moral position - it's a fact. It's scary - people are going to get it wrong - but there really is no book or wise man that can tell us what to do in every situation and to pretend otherwise would be false policy in my view. I see why some think this is a bad idea to share with others because it could lead to barbarity - but I would point out they said that about established religion, most places that don't have one are relatively peaceful. quite a lot of the ones that do aren't. Perhaps putting the onus on people to make their own moral decisions makes them think about it a bit more carefully.

Cure of Ars,

Re; "...on what basis can you tell anyone that they are wrong?"

Agreement. The law. We agree on what will be allowed and what will not. And yes, the law is enforced with power. But the source of power, at least in a Democracy, is also agreement. Those who disagree with the law, disagree with the agreement, do so at their peril.

One of my favorite papers of all time: Why People are Irrational about Politics. http://home.sprynet.com/~owl1/irrationality.htm

Randy,

"Agreement. The law. We agree on what will be allowed and what will not. And yes, the law is enforced with power. But the source of power, at least in a Democracy, is also agreement. Those who disagree with the law, disagree with the agreement, do so at their peril."

So early American slave owners where not immoral during their time because it was not against the law? Your position that the mob is always right sounds a lot like unrational secular fundamentalism to me.

ChrisA,

“Really? Where is this law written? In our DNA?”

Poetically speaking, I would say on the human heart. Where is the meaning of a human smile written? For every human, no matter what culture, smiling, laughing, crying means the same thing. It is written into us as humans. Natural law is the same type of thing.

“Unfortunately (or maybe not) we really do have to make our own moral decisions, this isn't a moral position. it's a fact. It's scary - people are going to get it wrong - but there really is no book or wise man that can tell us what to do in every situation and to pretend otherwise would be false policy in my view.”

I don’t disagree with what you are saying here. Thomas Aquinas distinguished three parts to a moral action. There is the subjective intention, the relative situation, and the objective natural law. All three areas have to be moral for the act to be moral. Reducing morality to just intention, or just a relative situation is lacking when making rational moral decisions.

"Unfortunately (or maybe not) we really do have to make our own moral decisions, this isn't a moral position - it's a fact. It's scary - people are going to get it wrong - but there really is no book or wise man that can tell us what to do in every situation and to pretend otherwise would be false policy in my view. I see why some think this is a bad idea to share with others because it could lead to barbarity"

I am not advocating people not thinking for themselves or making moral decisions for themselves. What I am saying is that there are universal moral laws that we are bound to follow. How we apply those moral laws to a situation can only be made by the individual. How to apply natural law is not always clear cut but it is helpful to look to those who are wise. But your point being the case does not negate that there is a universal natural law.

Cure of Ars,

Re; "Your position that the mob is always right sounds a lot like unrational secular fundamentalism to me."

Of course it does, because you are invested in the existance of moral absolutes. My position is rational. It is an acceptance of the fact that the human brain is limited in space and time. That we do not, therefore, have the ability to know the truth. That the closest we can get to "the truth" is "what works". The problem with your position is that you have mistaken the two.

The good news is that the only real difference between "the truth" and "what works" is that the acceptance of the limitations of the human brain allows room for acceptance of those who would try paths other than the known path - to recognize the possibility that there may be other paths that work.

Consider the scientific method. It starts with observation and hypothesis and ends with a theory. Sometimes the theory becomes so widely accepted that it is classified as a law. But the scientific method always leaves room for the possibility that a theory or even a law might be disproved in space or time. The scientific method is based on what works.