Daniel Gross points out another area in which banks were apparently using low margin business to sell high-margin investment banking businss: commercial loans. This has JP Morgan/Chase in a bit of a bind:
As the once-gentlemanly business of providing revolving credit lines evolved into a sharp-elbowed competition to provide investment banking services, Chase embraced the new aggressive tactics. Frequently, loans were seen as a lever to gain more highly profitable investment banking business.In the late '90s, the most needy borrowers, not coincidentally, also provided the most lucrative investment banking opportunities. Deal-junkie energy traders (Enron), telecommunications infrastructure giants (WorldCom, Global Crossing), and serial acquirers like Tyco—Chase lent to them all with abandon. Of course, anybody who has applied for a line of credit knows that bankers routinely turn down opportunities to lend money. Increasingly, however, Chase abandoned the risk-averse posture of a commercial banker for the transaction-driven mania of an investment banker. Shying away from risky deals would have meant forfeiting lucrative fees and market share to Citigroup, as well as Merrill Lynch and Goldman Sachs.
Now Chase is paying the price for letting investment banking imperatives overwhelm sound lending judgment. Today Chase, with a market cap of $49 billion, is a mere shadow of Citigroup, which is worth $191 billion. As Chase retrenches, slashing jobs and exiting businesses, Citigroup continues to expand through acquisitions. Indeed, despite all the reputational damage it has suffered, much of Citigroup's core business is sound. The same can't be said for Chase. And it's easier to make over an image than a balance sheet.
The fat margins in the banking business seem to have made everyone in the financial sector either irresponsible or insane. Why was this so?
Well, the margins are awfully fat. An IPO involves maybe a couple of hundred or thousand hours of work on the part of the bankers. Yet fees start around $5 million for that work. Conservativel, that's an hourly rate of $2500. And while it doesn't take that much more work to do a $1 billion IPO than to do one for $10 million, the fees are the same: 7% of the proceeds. (Not to mention any money banks make by giving underpriced IPO's to their special friends, who immediately flip it and thereby generate nice commissions for the bank).
Why are they so fat? Say it with me now: regulation. The SEC has kept the shape of the market essentially unchanged for 80 years, without which the business of listing a security would probably be but a shadow of its former self. Also, because only certain people can do IPO and merger work, the SEC forms a barrier to entry into the business. So there are sufficiently few banks for tacit price collusion to be possible. (It's not as bad as it sounds. Tacit price collusion just means no one lowers their price, because the other banks would retaliate. It's not just in banks, either; it's the reason all American cars at a given level have roughly the same price, and all the toothpaste in the store costs about the same.) The fees are 7% because the financial community is sufficiently incestuous to make sure that no one drops their fees to 6.5% to win more business. And because CFO's and CEO's aren't really very price sensitive. It's much more important to them to do an IPO with a big bank and impress the shareholders than to squeeze out ever last drop of price concessions, because after all, it's not their money they're giving away.
But that's not the only reason, because fees have been 7% for a long time, and the insane subversion of other business lines to the will of the investment banking juggernaut is recent. The other thing you have to remember is the bubble. The bubble made that 7% a lot bigger. And made it ever easier to get other business by giving special treats to their friends.
Well, they're paying the price now. But they won't learn from it, because Wall Street is a very young business, and thrives on the influx of young aggressive men who don't remember the last crisis. Sigh. On the other hand, I think JP Margan/Chase is going to change its name to JP MOrgan some time in the not-to-distant future, and it will be nice to have the House of Morgan back again. In name if not in spirit.
What Chase was doing was not all that nefarious. They were simply taking the entire relationship with a customer into account in pricing their services. Other banks, and other businesses do this all the time. For example, as a tax accountant, if a client uses a lot of my consulting services I am likely to give her a better price on the preparation of her tax return.
Where Chase evidently did wrong was in mispricing the risks associated with their commercial lending business. A $10 million profit on an investment banking deal cannot make up for a $100 million loss on a commercial loan. But that doesn't mean a bank shouldn't give a favorable rate to an investment banking client -- as long as it's a quality loan!
Posted by: David Walser on December 7, 2002 01:53 PMDavid,
Anyone will write a quality loan, if Chase wanted to lure investment banking clients with commercial loans they had to write loans at below the market rate of interest for that loan; i.e. a loan where the risk and reward were mis-aligned for the bank.
It's not nefarious, just not good buisness if the investment banking fees don't cover the extra risk, as they fail to now.
Posted by: Steve on December 7, 2002 05:01 PMComments are Closed.