January 31, 2002

silhouette3.JPG From the desk of Mindles H. Dreck:

Game Theory and The State of The Union

Many pundits have been reacting to the State of the Union, particularly Bush's singling out North Korea, Iran and Iraq for harsh criticism and referring to them using World War II terminology. Pundits debate whether this amounts to a "unilateral" declaration of war, and worry over the effect on European relations etc. I think they are missing the point. The speech was about making credible threats against terrorism. The intended audiences for this remark were terrorist regimes and those wavering at home. And the purpose was to increase the credible threat power of the U.S.

Sports writers such as James Campion will tell you that Muhammad Ali put on his crazy act at weigh-ins deliberately:

Flailing about like a lunatic, and braying like a wild banshee, The Kid planted the seed of doubt. He whipped himself into a frenzy. “Float like a butterfly, sting like a bee!” he screamed the day of the weigh-in. In front of the Miami Boxing Commission, former champions, Joe Louis and Sugar Ray Robinson, and hundreds of reporters, he concluded the frantic show with a prediction of an eight-round knockout. After the near riot in the crowded room, the writers gave The Kid little chance. The Bear did not agree. “Only a crazy man wouldn’t be afraid of Liston,” said writer, Robert Lipsyte. “Ali convinced the champ he was entering the ring with one of the craziest.”

If you can convince your opponent that you have little regard for rules, convention or your own well-being, you have a leg up in the fight. Some think Tyson is up to this as well, although it would seem to have backfired. You have to admit, though, it is definitely scary. If I had to fight, I'd rather fight someone with a sense of self-preservation.

Game Theory, as developed by Von Neumann, and formalized by figures such as John Nash (update: relevant link here), provides a framework for this sort of action. Game Theory describes the potential outcome of a contest between a limited number of players, each attempting to "split up a pie" or maximize the utility of an outcome. An important mechanism that helps define the outcome is "threat power". Threat power is the ability of one player to damage another net of the other player's ability to damage him. If you don't care about your life (or your things, your family, convention, public opinion, etc.), you can sustain little damage, in utility terms. Any damage you can inflict is a threat power advantage.

That threat power advantage is the problem with terrorists. If terrorists cared about themselves, their neighbors, or their homeland and citizens, they really wouldn't be terrorists. Given some decent explosives, they can damage any democratic sovereign state far more than they can be damaged. As is demonstrated in this analysis of a highjacking, any progress towards their ends will inspire a never-ending chain of terrorism. It's all gain, and no loss, from the terrorist perspective.

The United States is restrained by world opinion, by domestic opinion, by its democratic nature, by its concern for civilian casualties and by its respect for our world's conventions. These are all good things, but they reduce our threat power.

While Bush's speech made us all a little nervous, it was intended to make terrorist sponsors nervous. The jangling of European nerves was a side effect. This was a forceful speech intended to show terrorist regimes and dictators that:

a) we won't necessarily be restrained by a need to please Europe or other parts of the world, and

b) we won't be restrained by waiting for an open act of aggression on your part.

The point was to increase our threat power. It would not have been effective if it weren't as jarring as it was. A credible threat can save lives, avoid conflict and increase bargaining power, however unattractive and realpolitik it may seem. A threat can actually eliminate the need for action rather than make it necessary. And certain critics need to wake up and notice that we haven't actually gone to war without consulting their governments first, we're just saying we reserve the right to do so. In Iran's case, a strong threat may actually push them in our direction, if we make the alternative unpleasant enough.

Think about it. If so many Arabs from Egypt and Saudi Arabia feel so strongly about eliminating Israel, why don't they get together and invade? Because the Israelis have made it very clear they will kill the families, children and countrypeople of any aggressor without compunction the minute they see the threat. Israel has shown they will not be restrained by others' opinions or the possibility of escalation. Think about how they bombed Iraq's nuclear reactors. That's one of a few reasons the U.S. is so often the target of more organized terrorist groups. Up until now, we've been more restrained in our reaction.

Steven den Beste has been making this point all along - the point is not to please everyone, the point is to put some fear in these guys:

It is not possible for us to convert hatred into friendship, but we can convert contempt into dread.

Show them you will hit them wherever it hurts most. Game Theory just puts it in an analytical framework.

One of game theorists' favorite incidents to analyze is the Cuban Missile Crisis. Here's another example.

ADDENDUM - Feb. 6: And here's a note for those of you who are here due to my recent "antiwar" link:

You'll notice several items in the screed you just read that aren't in quotes. That would be because I didn't say them (!). For instance:

1) "there's no real need to worry". There's lots of reason to worry, both because these terrorist states have us in their sights, and because addressing the threat they pose is necessarily a high risk, high stakes game. As some of my articulate correspondents have noted, there are times threats have worked (the Cuban Missile Crisis) and times they have been reduced to meaningless bluster. Hopefully, this time is not one of the latter.

2) "Declaration of war" - there was no declaration of war - at least from our side..

Whether you like it or not, Game theory is a legitimate way to examine geopolitics, taught in graduate schools and discussed in Foreign Affairs and such. Because it is merely an analytical framework, however, it renders no judgement on the actions of the players. It merely attempts to analyze the conditions that lead to success or failure (as determined by each player advancing their own interests) The analysis is amoral, which appears to be what has driven the author to distraction, and he has projected that amorality onto yours truly.

We use tools like this all the time. When one looks at the cost of a social program, or a medical treatment, it is necessary to specify how many lives are saved or improved vs. the cost. In most cases, saving the last life or addressing the last grievance is prohibitively expensive. That doesn't make the analysis moral or immoral, it just means that there is a moral decision to be made once the analysis is done. But it is important to measure the chances of success as well as examine our method of achieving it. History is full of examples of success in advancing interests achieved by immoral means.

If you are interested, another source of power in game theory is coalition-building. Our coalition-building power appears to have been insufficient thus far to combat terrorism and neutralize the threat power advantage of terrorists and terror-sponsoring regimes.

The comparison to Ali and Tyson was made only to illustrate the concept of changing threat power. I can find some agreement with Mr. Raimondo that, in the sphere of international relations, we should not behave like boxers preparing for a fight.

Finally, my reaction to this:

Well, put this in an analytical framework, Andreas – and you too, Ms. Postrel: because Americans do care about their lives, their things, their families, their conventions (otherwise known as morality), public opinion – and their constitutional form of government. Which is why this "crazy man" strategic perspective can only be deployed by a terrorist or a totalitarian.

That's exactly my point, thank you for making it again. These terrorists and thugocracies have one primary source of power - they can live with many awful consequences of their actions and we by definition cannot. A successful war on terrorism would ramp up the cost in their cost/benefit analysis to the point where at least those with some semblance of rationality would choose to pursue their objectives in some other way. We need to experiment and innovate to neutralize the terrorists' advantage.

There are many levers to push in an attempt to increase the perceived costs of aggression against us and our allies, such as sanctions, financial isolation and international pressure. But one cannot deny that the perception that we are willing to use force quickly, and suffer significant costs to ourselves in doing so is one of those levers. We must both threaten and use force with discretion.

A threat that one does not have to make good on is called a "deterrent". I hope we will find deterrents that are both successful and moral in the coming months and years. This is a risky business, fraught with worry - and it was so long before the State of the Union.

One thing about deterrents - if they are successful it's not obvious. I happen to believe the horrible prospect of mutual assured destruction was a net contributor to stability in the latter half of the twentieth century. Since it can only be compared to a hypothetical alternative, and since it is a behavioral theory (like game theory)we cannot prove that.

We will never construct a society or set of rules such that it is no longer necessary to consider how to advance our interests. There is no final state, only progress. However, a dynamic system of free, wealth-generating democracies advancing their interests, can improve everyone's lot.

Also - one quick word defending libertarianism from the antiwar interpretation: Libertarianism allows for limited government. One of government's legitimate roles is to defend our citizens and advance our sovereign interests. I don't see an inconsistency in a libertarian examining and possibly supporting this legitimate role of government. We aren't "antigovernment" (or dare I say "antigovernment.com") we're in favor of limited government.

Posted by Mindles H. Dreck at January 31, 2002 10:07 PM | Technorati inbound links
Comments

Remember when the INS (actually, the US Marshals) went to Florida and made a raid to seize Elian Gonzales away from his relatives? 50 armed men made a military raid, and a picked team of four went into the house. Fully armed with combat-grade automatic rifles, one of the things they did was to shout "Freeze or we'll kill you!" at the family in the house. Which, not surprisingly, scared the crap out of them.

Later one of the women complained about the threat, and completely missed the point: the Marshals learned a long time ago that a screamed threat like that often obviates the need to actually kill someone. And indeed that is what happened there. The Gonzales family was so damned scared that they handed Elian over to the agents, who took him away, and no shots were fired.

Posted by: Steven Den Beste on February 2, 2002 12:30 AM

Surely threat power turns into threat bluster unless it's eventually backed up with actions? If the axis of evil (I'll spare everyone the ironic quotes, I don't like these guys either) doesn't cave in with fright, that's the prospect.

I think at some point Bush and his administration will have to either (1) basically admit they're bluffing, because years have passed and little or nothing has happened to the axis of evil, or (2) make clear with actions, as opposed to rhetoric, that they weren't.

I assume you would not be happy with (1). You're less clear about (2), although in the past you've admitted some concern about "biting off more than we could chew" with Iraq. I should think adding Iran and North Korea to the "to-do list" can't have improved things, but everyone's opinions evolve.

At any rate, I think deciding how you feel about the actual actions implied by the rhetoric seems more to the point than asserting that the rhetoric is clever -- however temporarily -- in its own right.

Posted by: Thomas on February 4, 2002 02:47 AM

It's true that "bluster" ultimately does little for us. John Stryker makes the same point in his "walking the walk" post. I find it interesting that you feel I consider this a successful strategy. I'm not sure it is, but I know that the threat power imbalance is a problem, and I'm interested in how it can be addressed.

The sad truth is I'm not sure how we could actually raise our threat power to a deterrent level against terrorists. We're a democracy, and we've got many other things on our agenda besides waging war. They are conducting an all-consuming jihad, and care little for domestic matters, broadly speaking. The imbalance is too striking.

It is possible that a rhetoric campaign against Iran and North Korea could accelerate the inevitable crumbling of their regimes. Iran is already facing increased demands for freedom from within, and Kim Jr. is a weak and distracted ruler.

Posted by: Andreas on February 4, 2002 07:50 AM

"It is not possible for us to convert hatred into friendship, but we can convert contempt into dread."

- It is possible to convert the friendship of US allies into hatred, and the current US administration is doing a fine job at that. A few years ago, I had the illusion that US was indeed the 'good' player. After its reaction on 9/11, I have seen it's just as bad, possibly worse than the other players.

Posted by: R Westerink on February 6, 2002 07:36 AM

First, on 'game theory.' Nothing sanatizes the rationality of war/aggression more than game theory. Obviously, those that followed the link to your site from antiwar.com will take objection to this method of analysis.
What's worse, is that more than anything else, game theory offers a philosophical justification for the terrorists actions. Afterall, in a play for power, what might be a good strategy: threatening or exercising an attack? As in lots of game strategies, for the terrorist, this one backfired.
Your analysis game theory analysis, in hindsight, is right. This will be destructive to the families and politics of the terrorists, but what if the damage had been more? What if they successfully get gov'ts of the world to spend themselves into a hole? What if it does bring about change? You, in fact, make this argument yourself: "Show them you will hit them wherever it hurts most."


Second, under game theory, this statement is totally false: "The United States is restrained by world opinion, by domestic opinion, by its democratic nature, by its concern for civilian casualties and by its respect for our world's conventions. These are all good things, but they reduce our threat power." There is nothing restraining the US and there is currently nothing to counter it. If the government was trully constrained by world opinion, we would probably be involved in many more Humanitarian/Arms-reduction/Environmental treaties.

In fact, you go on to say that exact same thing, "we won't necessarily be restrained by a need to please Europe or other parts of the world, and we won't be restrained by waiting for an open act of aggression on your part."


Third, your style of argumentation is very sophmoric. There is hardly a trace of original thought or even critical analysis. Although, I will say, you are very good at making the wrong conclusions, and I thank you for that.

Posted by: mmmBEER on February 6, 2002 04:34 PM

Congratulations on this self-critiquing comment, Or should I say "self-critiquing comment self-critiquing"?

Posted by: Andreas on February 6, 2002 05:04 PM

My favorite archetypal example of threat power comes from the movie "The Usual Suspects." At one point Kevin Spacey's character tells the purported story of the origins of the terrifying criminal mastermind Keyser Soze: A rival gang had invaded his home and seized his wife and small children, holding them at gunpoint as leverage. When Soze arrived and was confronted with this situation, he pulled out his gun and proceeded to shoot and kill his own family. Then he killed all of the gunmen but one, who was allowed to flee and spread the tale. Then Soze proceeded to completely wipe out the wives, children, parents, grandparents, etc. of every member of the rival gang. When he was finished, he disappeared - "poof".

Since then Keyser Soze has been the bogeyman of the crime world, who no one dares to cross.

Posted by: Daniel Wiener on February 8, 2002 04:00 PM

Reminds me of that great book "The Strategy of Conflict, by Thomas Schelling, sometimes called the father of Mutually Assured Destruction. Every fall, I hope he's getting the Economics Nobel. Alas, so far ...

Posted by: Roger Sweeny on June 20, 2002 02:23 PM

Policy in the US is clearly dictated by domestic opinion. The weight given to international opinion in US policy is defined by the considerations of its people. I can only imagine that, were terrorism to continue against the US and its interests over a prolonged period, that domestic opinion would move to a point where the public utility gained from 'adherence to world opinion... (and from)...its concern for civilian casualties and by its respect for our world's conventions' would fall below the public utility gained from the annihilation of the terrorist threat. In such an extreme situation I could quite well envisage the US following through with their threats regarding those 'Axes of Evil' and do so in a way that their hands are unfettered by their current values and doctrines. The atrocities of WWII were not considered so ‘atrocious’ within the context of domestic opinions and policies of perpetrating countries at the time..

Posted by: Timothy Johnston on November 21, 2003 08:20 AM

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