With the yen trading near 1 cent (for readers unfamiliar with Japan's currency fluctuations, this is a very high value, historically), The Economist's Global Agenda is wondering if the finance ministry has given up intervening in the currency markets to try to preserve the yen's artificially low value. And it argues that maintaining Japan's trade surplus isn't the only reason they were intervening:
Inflation is often described as the result of too much money chasing too few goods. Japan’s deflationary dilemma is the converse of this: not enough money, chasing too many goods. The Bank of Japan is doing its best to fix the first part of this problem, flooding the banking system with reserves. But as Andrew Smithers, an independent financial analyst, points out, this policy is doomed to failure, because one never really knows how much money is enough. The right amount will vary as the economy grows, and as the demand for money fluctuates. This is precisely the reason why most central banks target the price of money, in the form of short-term interest rates, rather than its quantity.Posted by Jane Galt at March 31, 2004 11:52 AM | TrackBack | Technorati inbound linksJapan cannot do this, of course: its short-term interest rates, at zero, are already as low as they can go. But as an alternative, Mr Smithers points out, it can still target the exchange rate—the foreign price of money. The finance ministry sold ¥20 trillion last year trying to keep the exchange rate steady. But, Mr Smithers argues, this did not go far enough. In an ideal world, the ministry would go on selling until the currency was thoroughly debauched and the economy decisively reflated.
Maybe they should insert perforated sheets of million yen notes as flyers in the daily newspapers. On the other hand, those damned frugal Japanese housewives might just stuff them into empty tea-pots.
Posted by: Will Allen on March 31, 2004 02:04 PMJapan's crisis was caused by inflating the money supply. The idea that it can be done away with be continuing to do so boggles the mind.
You'd think after 10+ years of slogging through a textbook Austrian business cycle, SOMEONE over there might have the brains to give ABCT's policy prescriptions a whirl.
Posted by: Noah Yetter on March 31, 2004 03:16 PM"But as an alternative, Mr Smithers points out ..."
No. His name is not Mr. Smithers. That's almost too funny to be real.
Posted by: el jefe on March 31, 2004 05:47 PMIt may well be that the Japanese have woken up to the prisoner's dilemma that is their currency program. If they keep intervening, they have to keep buying US Treasuries to manage their currency , the alternative being piles of currency under mattresses at the Finance Ministry. But if they keep buying Treasuries, they own the substantial devaluation risk, rather than the exporters, and they further feed the American trade deficit. If they stop intervening, they shed the devaluation risk and lose control of the offshore investment by the Japanese exporters, most of that investment now targeted for China and intended to replace Japanese exports. So what should they do? Should they encourage or discourage repatriation of offshore earnings?
Posted by: FXM on March 31, 2004 08:58 PMComments are Closed.