This was the weekend for spring meetings in Washington. The IMF, the World Bank, and the G-7 all met to hash out the problems facing the world, and suggest what might be done about them.
They didn't exactly come up with any surprises. The developing world is less poor than it used to be, thanks mainly to economic growth in India and China, but still a lot poorer than it ought to be, with billions of people living on less than $2 a day. Many people think that debt relief would help things a great deal, but though governments agree in principle, they're having trouble implementing it in practice; the US is blocking a scheme to sell off half the IMF's gold reserves in order to pay for all that relief. Why, I'm not exactly sure, since as far as I know the IMF isn't really using the gold for anything except the aesthetic pleasure of having a lot of shiny things crowded together in a vault.
[Many other people think the World Bank is the problem, not the solution. They spent the meetings camped out on the Mall, selling genuine replica Che hats and/or Club For Growth bumper stickers]
There was a great deal of fretting about oil prices. That's all people can really do--fret--since the causes of high oil prices, such as high demand in China, offer limited scope for even multinational action. Of course, the US could slap a whacking great carbon tax on, the way Europe has, but the political prospects for such an action seem remote at best.
To me, the most interesting part of the meetings is where the various government personnel confronted the problem of large and growing imbalances in the global economy. Basically, everyone knows what needs to happen. Europe and Japan need to kick up economic growth. America needs to kick up its national savings rate through some combination of tighter fiscal policy and household savings. And Asian banks need to stop flooding us with cheap capital in order to subsidize their export sector.
Unfortunately, while everyone knows what needs to happen, no one knows how to do it. Japan has been stuck in an economic quagmire for a decade, and hopes are fading that it has finally made its way out of the Slough of Despond. [There's an even bigger, scarier worry, which is that Japan is what a country in demographic decline looks like, and Europe will follow suit. But that's another post.] Europe has run into the fact that the one-size-fits-all monetary policy of a single currency can have disastrous effects when labour and capital aren't mobile; France and Germany, the eurozone's biggest economies, are stuck in nasty recessions, but the ECB, which wants to establish its street cred on inflation, seems to be preparing to raise rates this fall. And there is little political support for the kinds of broad-based microeconomic reforms that might goose growth at the cost of cushy employment protections.
China, meanwhile, feels it needs a low currency in order to keep its export sector workers happily labouring in their factories, instead of angrily converging on Beijing with torches and pitchforks. And it will take a braver politician than George Bush to tell Americans that they can't have their tax cuts and their government programmes. Everyone recognizes that the world has a big problem. Everyone is in favour of doing something about it--as long as someone else does the doing. No one is in favour of telling a restive citizenry that things can't go on as they are. And in some cases, it mighten't do much good. For example, it won't help to rein in America's budget deficit if Chinese central banks just start lending the money to Fannie Mae instead, touching off another wave of home refinancings.
The longer we wait to correct these imbalances, the more likely the correction is to be catastrophic. That doesn't mean that disaster is inevitable. As James Surowiecki points out, when you owe the bank $1 million, you have a problem, but when you owe the bank $300 billion, the bank has a problem; China and the other Asian central banks have every incentive to let us down easy, if they can, if only to prevent their huge portfolio of American bonds from, er, accelerated depreciation. But with every passing day that our leaders collude to do nothing, the darker scenarios grow more plausible.
I'm not sure the "savings rate" has much meaning. I don't save any money in bank savings accounts over more than a month without spending it, but have been ratcheting up my 401K every raise and next year it should be maxed out at 20%. That 401K contribution is not treated as savings by the government AFAIK. Likewise I am paying off my 15-year mortgage with no equity lines, second mortgages, etc. but this too is not treated as savings.
So in my mind, the "national savings rate" is a problematic measurement.
Posted by: Matthew Cromer on April 18, 2005 09:54 AMNational savings takes account of household ownership of stocks and bonds; the only kind of savings it would miss is if you were socking your money into, say, Rembrandts.
Posted by: Jane Galt on April 18, 2005 10:00 AMJane: How does the national savings measurement separate purchases of stocks and bonds by US citizens and foreigners then? That would seem to be very difficult to do. Is a household survey used to do this?
Posted by: jt on April 18, 2005 10:21 AMjane, yes pls explain...
all definitions of savings rate i have seen specifically exclude capital investment. although maybe they were just saying that the savings rate wasnt capturing the growth in value of the portfolio (which seemed stupid in 99, not so stupid in 05)
Posted by: hey on April 18, 2005 10:56 AMThe savings rate, as I understand it, does include capital investment, but not capital appreciation. So, 401K contributions increase the "savings rate," but the fact that your house is worth $100,000 more now than when you bought it, is not included in the savings rate. Of course, you haven't really saved it, you've only had a paper gain.
In any event, the post was really good. Of course I'm really interested in that "another post" about demographic decline. That's been one of my fears that to some degree economies are just very large ponzi schemes, but it's the only one where the bottom layer is always larger than the 2nd to bottom layer, so it works. That's ending in Japan and Europe so it's possible their economies and even valuations are due for a significant correction, one that will eventually be mirrored here. The fundamental basis of which is, as fewer people inherit more, each person has more, and demand decreases. My grandparents have 2 houses, but only 2 children, both children already own their houses. If this is replicated on a large scale, people have more houses than they need house prices drop. Oh well.
The other point As James Surowiecki points out, when you owe the bank $1 million, you have a problem, but when you owe the bank $300 billion, the bank has a problem; China and the other Asian central banks have every incentive to let us down easy, if they can, if only to prevent their huge portfolio of American bonds from, er, accelerated depreciation.
This is one part of the analysis that is largely missing from current economic analysis and it is said. American consumers are properly responding to the stimulus provided by foreign banks. But ultimately, it is the FCBs who really have the problem. If they're lending at a below market rate or even a "negative" market rate, shouldn't American consumers take them up on that offer? Eventually however, if they stop lending, consumption will probably decline some, but consumption of domestic goods will probably increase more, only further adding to our own GDP. Just some thoughts. Wish you the best.
Posted by: Joel B. on April 18, 2005 11:14 AMExactly. We have the stuff, i.e. cars, DVD players, clothes, while they have little pieces of paper that have whatever value you can negotiate for it. It troubles me not one bit that China holds US treasuries- if they tired to sell them all they would not be able to sell at par, just like Bill Gates can't sell all his Microsoft stock on one day.
Posted by: Tassled Loafered Leech on April 18, 2005 05:37 PMJane: Can you say some more about the "darker scenarios" and how they might play out.
Posted by: bob on April 18, 2005 10:34 PMThe US seems like the odd man out in this scenario. The budget deficit is a real problem; the current accounts deficit sounds like free riding on bad decisions made elsewhere. Besides increased inflationary pressure, what would be the downside if the Asian central banks stopped boosting the dollar tomorrow?
Posted by: Zach on April 19, 2005 12:25 AMComments are Closed.